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I. INTRODUCTION
As a national source of tourism, the Swiss Alps are, at least in one
sense, overshadowed by the banks and finance companies of Switzerland.
Because of the relatively strict Swiss banking secrecy laws, the stability of
the Swiss franc and the long-standing expertise of Swiss banks in cur-
rency trading, financial tourists in the past have relied with alarming
consistency on Switzerland's financial system to "launder," i.e., intro-
duce into the normal flow of legitimate capital, funds or assets stemming
from illegal activities.1 Proof of Switzerland's status as a capital for fi-
nancial tourism lies in the oft-observed coincidence that the trails of
world-wide drug syndicates, dictators, stock market manipulators and
tax evaders invariably - if only initially - lead through Switzerland.2
Until recently, participation in the laundering of assets known to
have stemmed from a crime was not, other than under certain rare cir-
cumstances, subject to criminal sanctions in Switzerland. In the absence
of applicable legislation, and in response to pressure from Swiss bank
regulators to address suspected misuses of Swiss banking services, certain
voluntary measures were taken by Swiss banks in 1977 in the form of a
private agreement between the Swiss Bankers' Association (SBA) and
member banks of the SBA. The agreement (the "Agreement of Due
Care" or "Agreement") entered into in the immediate aftermath of the
so-called "Chiasso affair,"3 established among other things, a duty of due
I Tdglich eine Million Dollar gewaschen, Tages-Anzeiger, Nov. 11, 1988, No. 264 at 31. Ajoint
study of the Swiss National Bank and the Swiss cantonal public prosecutors' offices, for example,
determined that 26 different kidnapping investigations alone during the years 1970 and 1978 in-
volved ransom money laundered through Swiss banks. Massnahmen gegen "Geldsduberung," Neue
Ziircher Zeitung (NZZ), May 9/10, 1981, No. 106 at 9; B. Messerli, Die Geldwdschereide lege lata et
ferenda, 105 SCHWZERSCHE ZEITsCHRIFT FOR STRAFRECHT (ZStrR) 418, 421 n. 8 (1988).
2 See, eg., N. SCHMID, BANKEN ZWISCHEN LEGALITrXT UND KRIMINALITAT 189-191 (1986)
(King Faisal of Iraq, King Faruk of Egypt, Algerian Liberation Front, Ex-Shah of Iran Pahlevi, and
Presidents of Argentina, Kongo-Katanga, Nicaragua); Internationale Rechtshife - Gefahrflr das
Bankgeheiinnis, NZZ, Aug. 30, 1989, No. 200 at 21 (Marcos, Irangate, drug mafia); The Lifestyle of
Rich the Infamous, FORTUNE, Dec. 2, 1988, at 38 (tax fugitive Marc Rich). Cf Nationalrat will
schdrferen Geldwdscher-Artikel, Tages-Anzeiger, Nov. 28, 1989, No. 277 at 9 (statement of member
of Swiss House of Representatives)("no country can point to as many illegal banking transactions as
Switzerland").
3 See AGREEMENT ON THE OBSERVANCE OF CARE BY THE BANKS IN THE ACCEPTANCE OF
FUNDS AND ON THE PRACTICE OF BANKING SECRECY (Vereinbarung fiber die Sorgfaltspfiicht bei
der Entgegennahme von Geldern und6 die Handhabung des Bankgeheimnisses) (VSB 1977). The
Chiasso affair involved revelations that the director of the Chiasso, Tessin branch of a major Swiss
bank had systematically abused his position to accept and reinvest. through a Liechtenstein finance
company, over 2.2 billion Swiss francs stemming from Italy in violation of Italian currency restric-
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care for signatory banks in the identification of would-be account holders
and depositors.
The Agreement has been described as a "certificate of morality" for
Swiss banks.' Nonetheless, the Agreement and its duty of identification
- now in force for more than a decade5 - arguably represented a less than
adequate means of hindering the laundering of funds through Swiss
banks and other financial vehicles.6 In the wake of several recently un-
covered scandals - including the so-called "Pizza Connection" 7 and the
more recent "Lebanon Connection" 8 - the lack of criminal sanctions ap-
plicable to money laundering has become the major focus of attention of
the Swiss media, the Swiss public, and, ultimately, the Swiss legislature.
The Lebanon Connection assumed an important political dimension not
only because of the magnitude and the character of the affair,9 but also
because investigation of the matter indirectly resulted in the resignation
and criminal investigation of, ironically enough, the very Swiss Federal
Council member responsible at the time with supervising the drafting of
legislation to criminalize money laundering.10
tions. W. MAURER, ZUM STREIT UM DAS BANKGEHEIMNIS DER SCHWEIZ: ZWEI VORSCHLAGE ZU
SEINER ENTSCHARFUNG 19 (1981).
4 I. WALTER, SECRET MONEY: THE WORLD OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SECRECY 106
(1985).
5 Since its adoption in 1977, the Agreement has been renewed twice. See AGREEMENT ON THE
OBSERVANCE OF CARE BY THE BANKS IN THE ACCEPTANCE OF FUNDS AND ON THE PRACTICE OF
BANKING SECRECY OF 1ST JULY 1982 (official English version) (ACB 1982) and AGREEMENT ON
THE SWISS BANKS' CODE OF CONDUCT WITH REGARD TO THE EXERCISE OF DUE DILIGENCE,
JULY 1, 1987 (official English version).
6 See, eg., U. Zulauf, Die Eidgen"ssische Bankenkommission und Geldwdscherei, 7 RECHT 79,
84-85 (1989) (identification duty inadequate to discourage money laundering); Emmentaler: Banken-
Sorgfalt nach wie vor mit grossen Lcher, SHZ, Mar. 26, 1987, No. 13 at 3 (Agreement's usefulness in
combating money laundering outnumbered by numerous "loopholes" in Agreement); M.
Schwabold, Bericht fiber die Diskussionen, 39 WiRTSCHAFr UND RECHT (WuR) 237 (1987) (loop-
holes in Agreement's identification duty).
7 The Pizza Connection was uncovered in the spring of 1984, with charges that profits from the
sale of $1.6 billion worth of heroin had been laundered through various Swiss banks and finance
companies over a five-year period. Zulauf, supra note 6, at 80.
8 The Lebanon Connection entailed November 1988 allegations that several of Switzerland's
top banks, among others, had assisted a Lebanese-Turkish drug ring over a two-year period in the
laundering of proceeds - at least partly stemming from illegal drug trade - totalling over 1.5 billion
Swiss francs, or nearly one billion dollars. Tilglich eine Million Dollar gewaschen, supra note 1; C.
GRABER, GELDWA.SCHEREI 42 (1990).
9 See Wichtiger als Geldw&cher bestrafen ist die Verbrecherorganisation treffen, Tages-Anzeiger,
Nov. 12, 1988, No. 265 at 33 (Lebanon Connection largest Swiss money laundering scandal to date).
The Lebanon Connection presented a classical, now nearly archaic form of money laundering. See,
Geldwdcherek Dampf aufgesetzt, Schweizerische Handelszeitung (SHZ), Nov. 10, 1988, No. 45 at
17 (illegal drug profits entered Switzerland on daily basis via couriers carrying briefcases filled with
dollar bills in small denominations).
10 See Bundesanwalt erhebt Anklage gegen Alt-Bundesrdtin Kopp, Tages-Anzeiger, Sept. 22,
1989, No. 220 at 1 (charges of violation of official secrecy laws against former member of Swiss
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Like the 1977 Chiasso affair, the Lebanon Connection, too, left its
mark on the Swiss banking environment:" immediately subsequent
thereto, the Swiss Federal Council (Bundesrat) accelerated the usual tur-
tle-like pace of Swiss legislative reform with respect to efforts which were
already underway to criminalize money laundering, 2 and the new legis-
lation was approved by the Swiss Parliament to take effect August 1,
199013.
The purpose of-this Article is to examine and assess approaches
taken in the past and under the new legislation in addressing the misuse
of Swiss banks, attorneys, notaries, trustees and other Swiss professionals
as conduits for money laundering transactions.'4 Part II briefly presents
certain preliminary considerations relevant to the question of money
laundering in Switzerland, while Part III outlines and assesses those pro-
visions of the Agreement of Due Care relating to the identification by
banks of beneficial owners' assets. Next, Part IV describes the status of
money laundering under both the new legislation specifically applicable
to money laundering and other Swiss criminal laws with limited applica-
tion in this area. Finally, Part V explores the effectiveness of the new
legislation and the feasibility of certain additional measures to address
the problem of money laundering in Switzerland.
II. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
Any attempt to establish a due care standard or legal norm in Swit-
zerland applicable to members of the banking profession and other pro-
fessions susceptible to misuse for purposes of money laundering must, as
Federal Council (Bundesrat); latter allegedly warned husband of impending federal investigation
into finance company upon whose board of directors husband was serving); Freispruch f'r Kopp,
Tages-Anzeiger, Feb. 24, 1990, No. 98 at 1 (former Federal Council member exculpated of violating
official secrecy laws).
11 The Lebanon Connection has had an impact outside Switzerland as well. See Neue Sorgfaltsp-
flichtverinbarung Liechtensteins, NZZ, Oct. 11, 1989, No. 236 at 33 (recent adoption of revised
Agreement of Due Care by Liechtenstein banks and drafting of federal legislation to criminalize
money laundering tracking that enacted in Switzerland).
12 Geldwdscherek Dampf aufgesetzt, supra note 9.
13 AS 19901 1077 f. See Strafnormen gegen Geldwscherei ab L August in Kraft, NZZ, July 4,
1990, No. 152 at 23. Drafting of the legislation, which received final legislative approval in March
1990, commenced in June 1986. P. Bernasconi, Grenzueberschreitende Wirtschaftskriminalitdt, 83
SCHWEIZERISCHE JURISTISCHE ZEITUNG (SJZ) 73, 82 n. 24 (1987). Cf. P. FORSrMOSER & A.
MEIER/HAYoZ, EiNFOHRUNG IN DAS SCHWEIZERISCHE AKTIENREcHT 329 (4th ed. 1989)(contin-
uing efforts, begun over twenty years ago, to partially revise the Swiss Company Code).
14 Thus, separate but related questions relating to the misuse of Swiss banks for the perpetration
of acts constituting crimes under the tax and currency laws of foreign countries, but not under those
of Switzerland, will be left aside.
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a preliminary matter, take into consideration the various legal and prac-
tical interests thereby implicated.
Money laundering is a follow-up deed essential to the successful
completion of certain types of crimes.15 Because the conspicuously large
cash sums or other assets earned through organized crime often leave
behind clearer, more condemning tracks than the very acts themselves,
such assets must be lent the appearance of earned income stemming
from legal activities through laundering transaction.16 Drug traffickers
in particular require money laundering services since illegal drugs are, of
necessity, paid for in cash, usually with banknotes of small denomina-
tions.1 7 An obvious public interest thus exists in making it difficult for
organized crime syndicates or other lawbreakers to avail themselves of
legitimate banking and other financial services to successfully wipe clean
an otherwise condemning criminal trail. 18
By virtue of their central position with respect to currency transac-
tions, asset management and, in particular, global payment transactions,
banking institutions play an important - albeit normally unwitting - role
in effecting the required laundering of tainted assets.19 Banks have a nat-
ural interest in ensuring that their services are not misused to render
untraceable proceeds stemming from criminal activities. Through ad-
verse publicity pointing to the bank's knowing or negligent participation
in a money laundering scheme, a bank's reputation could be irreparably
damaged and deposit balances correspondingly diminished. On the other
hand, however, banks also have an interest in making sure that banking
transactions are entered into and executed in the most rational and ac-
commodating manner possible without the waste of time, and the arous-
ing of customer resentment and mistrust entailed by detailed inquiry into
15 Bernasconi, supra note 13, at 81. A typical wash cycle might involve, e.g., first, an exchange
of tainted funds for banknotes of large denominations in various currencies; second, the exchange of
such banknotes for bearer checks, bearer credit, bearer certificates of deposit or other movable valua-
ble assets, such as precious metals and securities; and finally, the transfer of such "goods" into
another country. See Geldwdscherek Nach der Art der Indianer, SHZ, Feb. 26, 1987, No. 9 at 3
(quoting P. Bernasconi, former chief prosecuting attorney of Canton Tessin).
16 See P. BERNASCONi, FINANZUNTERWELT: GEGEN WIRTSCHAFTSKRIMINALrrXT UND OR-
GANISIERTES VERBRECHEN 27-28 (1988) (dependency on money laundering so-called "Achilles
heel" of organized crime).
17 Dos Geld kommt tdglich kofferweise, Tages-Anzieger, Nov. 4, 1988, No. 149 at 33.
18 Cf US-Grosseinsatz gegen die Geldwdscherei, NZZ, Nov. 25/26, 1989, No. 275 at 33 (state-
ment of U.S. Senate Banking Committee member) (easier to catch key drug mafia members through
financial transactions than through illegal drug trade).
19 Zulauf, supra note 6, at 79. A significant securities or tax fraud which does not at some point
require the services of a bank for its perpetration is scarcely imaginable. C. MEER, WIMTSCHAFrS-
DELIKTE IM BANKENGEWERBE 111 (1986) (citing K MUELLER & H.B. WABNrrZ, WIRTSCHAFrS-
KRIMINALITrAT 117 (1982)).
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each and every transaction.2 ° Such interest is heightened by the prag-
matic observation that even the most probing of bank inquiries cannot, in
every instance, determine the criminal or non-criminal origin of cus-
tomer assets.2 1
In Switzerland, questions involving the knowing or negligent partic-
ipation of Swiss bankers and other professionals in money laundering
schemes are further complicated through certain privacy interests recog-
nized as components of the general right to individual privacy protected
under the Swiss Civil Code22 and effectuated in Swiss banking and crimi-
nal laws23. Members of certain Swiss professions, for example, including
attorneys and notaries,24 are forbidden under professional confidentiality
provisions of the Swiss Penal Code from disclosing to third parties infor-
mation concerning a client in the absence of client consent or other ex-
tenuating factors 25. Thus, Swiss attorneys appointed to open bank
accounts or carry out other bank transactions with client assets are gen-
erally not permitted, and generally may not be compelled, to disclose to
enforcement authorities or relevant bank officials the identity of relevant
clients.26
20 C. MEIER, id. at 88. See Judgment of the Second Public Law Division of June 25, 1982,
Decisions of the Swiss Federal Tribunal (Entscheidungen des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts)
(BGE) 108 lb 186, 191 (bank inquiry into economic background of each small, commonplace or
unimportant banking transaction would incur large administrative expenses and create customer
misunderstandings).
21 Cf. W. MAURER, supra note 3, at 35. Cf. D. Zuberbihler, Das Verhdltnis zwischen der
Bankenaufsicht, insbesondere der Ueberwachung der einwandfreien Geschdftst&tfgkeit, und der neuen
Sorgfatspfltchtvereinbarung der Banken, 39 WuR 167, 175 (1987) (due to tremendous volume and
hectic nature of modem business transactions, even the most cautious of banks are unable to avoid
being misused for illegal or dubious transactions).
22 Swiss Civil Code (Schweizerisches Zivilgesetzbuch vom 10. Dezember 1907 (SR 210) [ZGB]).
Arts. 27 & 28.
23 See U. EMCH & H. RENz, DAs ScHWmzERIscHE BANKGEscHHXT: DAs PRAKTISCHE
LEHRBUCH UND NACHSCHLAGBUCH FOR BANKEN UND BANKKUNDEN 138 (3rd ed. 1984).
24 In Switzerland, as in many other European countries, notaries are appointed government offi-
cials primarily responsible for the official recording of documents.
25 Swiss Penal Code (Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch vom 21. Dezember 1937 (SR 311.0)
(StGB)), Art. 321 Sect. I (applies to clergymen, doctors, pharmacists, dentists, lawyers, notaries,
public notaries, auditors, and assistants of all preceding). Violations are subject to up to 3 years in
prison and/or fines of up to 40,000 Swiss francs. Arts. 36, 48 Sect. I para. 1, 106 I & 321 Sect. 1
para. 1, StGB. No limits exists, however, on the amount of fines which may be imposed in the case
of violations committed out of profit-seeking motives. Art. 48 Sect. I para. 1, StGB.
26 Circumstances justifying such a disclosure are limited to client consent (Art. 321 line 2,
StGB), the existence of a duty to testify or provide information under federal or cantonal law ex-
pressly made applicable to persons bound by professional confidentiality (Art. 321 line 3, StGB) or
the voluntary solicitation and procurement by such persons of written permission to testify or pro-
vide information from applicable supervisory authorities. G. STRATmNWRTH, SCHWEIZERISCHES
STRAFRECHT, BESONDERER TEIL I: STRAFrATEN GEGEN INDIVIDUALINTERESSEN Sect. 7, N. 22
(3rd rev. ed. 1983) [hereinafter STRATENWERTH BTU] (citing authorities). Cf Zuberbiier, supra
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Similarly, Swiss banks, for their part, are forbidden under the Fed-
eral Act Concerning Banks and Savings Banks (the "Swiss Bank Act"
or "Bank Act") from revealing the identity of account holders and other
bank customers to third parties, including regulatory and enforcement
authorities, absent customer consent or other extenuating circum-
stances.27 Moreover, Swiss law in general does not allow private persons
or entities to be placed under a duty to report possibly criminal activities
to governmental authorities other than in very limited instances.2" Thus,
the creation of a bank reporting duty applicable to customers who engage
in certain types of monetary transactions - a solution adopted in various
other jurisidictions29 - does not represent a viable option in
Switzerland.30
III. THE AGREEMENT OF DUE CARE
A. Purpose and Scope of Agreement
The Agreement of Due Care represents the first attempt within
Switzerland to hinder the misuse of Swiss banking services for effectuat-
ing illegal or dubious transactions, such as the laundering of illegally-
obtained assets. In proposing the new legislation and establishing a legal
duty of due care for individuals professionally engaged in financial trans-
actions, the Swiss Federal Council indicated that the Agreement - appli-
cable to banks - might serve as an important basis in the future for
determining the duty of due care.31 Nonetheless, it remains unclear
note 21, at 191 n. 53 (under various cantonal notary supervisory laws, Swiss notaries are subject to
disclosure duties with respect to the opening of accounts with funds entrusted to them by clients).
27 See Federal Act Concerning Banks and Savings Banks (Bundesgesetz fiber die Banken und
Sparkassen vom 8. Nov. 1934 (SR 952.0) (BankG)), Art. 47 Sects. I & II (up to six months imprison-
ment and/or fines of up to 50,000 Swiss francs for persons intentionally disclosing, or attempting to
incite the disclosure of, a banking secret in the absence of customer consent; fines of up to 30,000
Swiss francs for negligent disclosure). Circumstances nonetheless justifying a disclosure are limited
to the existence of a legally-recognized "crisis situation," Art. 34, StGB, or of a duty under federal or
cantonal law or regulations to testify or provide information to governmental authorities. Art. 47
Sec. IV, BankG.
28 Bernasconi, supra note 13, at 85.
29 Cf., g., US-Grosseinsatzgegen die Geldwdscherei, supra note 18 (under Currency and Foreign
Transactions Reporting Act of 1970, U.S. banks required to report cash transactions exceeding
$10,000 or, in some cases, $3,000, to U.S. Treasury Department; additional duty under Money
Laundering Act to notify criminal authorities as to suspicious account movements); EG-Richtlinie
gegen Geldwdcherei?, NZZ, Feb. 15, 1990, foreign ed. no. 37 at 13 (European Commission directive
to impose duty on banks and other financial institutions to report questionable transactions possibly
involving drug trade, terrorism or other criminal acts).
30 Cf Zulauf, supra note 6, at 81 n. 21 (no legal duty for banks to notify Banking Commission as
to illegal acts on parts of employees; authority of Commission under BankG to create such duty as-
yet unexercised).
31 Specifically, the Federal Council stated that professional groups in non-banking areas could
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whether proof that an individual employee has complied with Agreement
provisions will be sufficient alone to satisfy the legal duty of due care.32
The present version of the Agreement remains - at least technically - in
force until September 30, 1992.
The Agreement of Due Care applies to all signatory SBA banks and
their branches located in Switzerland, as well as to certain finance com-
panies of a banking nature with are SBA members.33 Although foreign
branches, representative offices, and subsidiary offices of signatory banks
are expressly excluded from the scope of the Agreement,34 signatory
banks may rely on customer references from their foreign branches or
offices to satisfy the Agreement's duty of identification to the extent that
the latter have been instructed to identify contracting partners in accord-
ance with Agreement provisions3".
The original purpose of the Agreement of Due Care, when entered
into in 1977, was "to ensure the careful clarification of the identity of
bank customers and to prevent that transactions contrary to the Agree-
ment are made possible or facilitated through an abuse of the right to
banking secrecy."36 In light of such a purpose, a signatory bank was
required under the 1977 Agreement to refrain from entering into a trans-
action where the bank knew or through the exercise of the required due
care should have known that the customer funds were being entrusted to
it for transactions contrary to the Agreement, including where it was
"recognizable" to the signatory bank that the entrusted funds stemmed
from an act constituting a crime or an extraditable offense under Swiss
law. The 1977 Agreement further required a signatory bank to sever
banking relations with a customer in the event the bank had reason to
develop detailed rules similar to those in the Agreement as a guideline for satisfying the due care
duty within those professions. BoTscHAFr UND GESETZESENTWURF VOM 12. JUNI 1989 OBER DIE
AENDERUNG DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN STRAFGESETZBUCHES (Gesetzgebung tiber die Geldwiischerei
und mangende Sorgfalt bei Geldgeschiften), BB II 1061ff, 1090 [hereinafter, "BOTSCHAFr"].
32 Recently, for example, the Swiss Federal Banking Commission warned that a Swiss bank
would be well advised not to continue certain practices explicitly provided for under the Agreement.
Eine Massnahme der Bankenkommission, NZZ, July 7/8, 1990, No. 155 at 33. See infra notes 80 &
81 and accompanying text.
33 Note 1, CDB 1987. Of all banks located in Switzerland, only a few agricultural credit coopera-
tives (Raiffeisenkassen) have not pledged to abide by the Agreement provisions. Zulauf, supra note
6, at 84 n. 62. Finance companies of a banking nature which are members of the SBA were first
made subject to the Agreement in 1987. A. Stdckli, Sorgfaltspflichtvereinbarung der Banken: Stel-
lung und Auftrag der bankengesetzlichen Revisionsstelle, 62 DER SCHWEIZER TREUHANDER [STr]
446,447 (1988). Unless otherwise indicated, the term "signatory bank" as used hereinafter will in-
clude both banks as well as finance companies of a banking nature which are SBA members.
34 Note 1, CDB 1987.
35 Id. at note 9.
36 Art. 1, VSB 1977.
37 Id. at Art. 2 para. b & Art. 4.
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suspect that the customer's funds stemmed from criminal activities.38
During the course of revisions in 1982, however, the objectives of
the Agreement of Due Care were reduced to the more modest goal "of
confirming, defining and laying down in a binding way the established
rules of good conduct in bank management ' 39 and, at the same time,
provisions of the 1977 Agreement prohibiting, at least in theory, the
assistance by Swiss banks in the effecting of money laundering transac-
tions were deleted, allegedly at the insistence of those who incorrectly
contended that a bank's lending of assistance in typical money launder-
ing transactions was already punishable at that time under the Swiss Pe-
nal Code4. Consequently, the only provisions pertinent to the question
of money laundering under the present Agreement of Due Care are those
which establish a standard of due care for Swiss banks with respect to the
verification of the identity of a contracting partner, a standard which
may be used, at least in part, as a basis for interpreting the newly adopted
legal duty of due care for individuals in financial transactions.41
B. Duty of Identification
L Identification of Contracting Partners
The duty of identification set forth in the current Agreement of Due
Care first entails a duty on the part of signatory banks to establish the
identity of a potential contracting partner prior to the commencement of
certain banking relations. Banking regulations encompassed by this duty
are: the opening of an account, passbook or securities account, the enter-
ing into of a fiduciary transaction, the renting of a safety-deposit box and
the execution of a cash transaction involving an amount exceeding
100,000 Swiss francs.42 Such duty of identification applies regardless of
whether the contemplated transaction is to be internally referenced under
38 Id. at Art. 12. See Zulauf, supra note 6, at 87, 87 n. 96 (failure of VSB 1977 money laundering
prohibition to attain practical significance; banks charged, on two occasions, with violating such
clause exonerated due to lack of concrete grounds indicating criminal origin of funds) (citing P.
Klauser, Drei Jahre ereinbarung fiber die Sorgfaltspflichten der Banken, 32 WuR 285, 294 f.
(1980), and L. Meyer, Weitere drei Jahre Vereinbarung fiber die Sorgfaltspflcht der Banken, 36
WuR 157, 167 f. (1984)).
39 Art. 1, Preamble, ACB 1982. Cf Art. I Preamble, CDB 1987 ("...a view to preserving the
good name of the Swiss banking community, nationally and internationally" and "establishing rules
ensuring, in the area of banking secrecy and when accepting funds, business conduct that is beyond
reproach").
40 See Zuberbiihler, supra note 21, at 181; Drz'ckten Banken Beiden Augen zu?, Tages-Anzeiger,
Nov. 22, 1988, No. 273 at 31.
41 See supra note 31 and accompanying text. The remaining undertakings in the Agreement
prohibit Swiss banks both from providing active assistance with respect to capital transfers in viola-
tion of a foreign country's currency laws (Art. 1 para. b & Art. 7, CDB 1987).
42 Art. 2, CDB 1987. "Cash transactions" are defined to include all transactions carried out at a
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a code or number rather under the client's name, or involves a bearer
savings book, the legal rights to which may eventually be transferred to a
holder unknown to the bank.43
A signatory bank is required under the Agreement to maintain writ-
ten records listing each contracting partner's full name and address and
describing the exact type of identification used to verify such partner's
identity.' Adequate methods to verify a contracting partner's identity
are elaborated in explanatory notes to the Agreement.4 5 In cases of per-
sonal negotiations between a signatory bank and an individual as con-
tracting partner, the bank is generally required to demand that the
relevant individual display an official identification document, such as a
passport, identity card or driver's license."6 The required proofing of
identification is stricter in the case of business relations with an individ-
ual entered into through correspondence.47 With respect to banking rela-
tions commenced with legal entities and companies, a signatory bank is
required to ascertain identity through listings in certain official commer-
cial registers or by obtaining a certificate of incorporation.48
In the case of banking relations commenced through personal nego-
tiations, the duty of signatory banks to examine official identification
documents does not, according to published precedent of the oversight
board appointed to enforce the Agreement ("Oversight Board" or
"Board"), entail a further duty, for example, to refuse to enter into bank-
ing relations, to conduct an investigation or to take similar action with
respect to potential contracting partners who present irregular or even
facially invalid identification documents.49 Not surprisingly, then, it has
bank's teller window, such as the changing of money, the purchase and sale of precious metals, cash
subscriptions to bank "cash bonds" and debenture loans, and the cashing of checks. Id. at Note 6.
43 I d at Notes 4 & 5.
44 Id. at Notes 16 & 17 (with respect to individuals, the address of domicile; for legal entities, the
business address).
45 See id. at Notes 7-17. The explanatory notes are relied upon for their interpretive value by the
oversight board appointed to adjudicate breaches of the Agreement. Meyer, supra note 38, at 169
(Proceeding IV).
46 CDB 1987, id at Note 7. Swiss residents personally known to the bank, however, are not
required to submit any identification while individuals not domiciled in Switzerland may, on an
exceptional basis, identify themselves by means of the recommendation of certain banks or of a
"trustworthy customer" personally known to the bank. Id at Note 8.
47 Id at Notes 10 & 11 (confirmation of domicile and, if domicile other than Switzerland, au-
thentication of contracting partner's signature by authorized bank or trustworthy customer person-
ally known to bank).
48 Id at Notes 12 - 14 (listing in Official Swiss Commerce Gazette or annual directory to Swiss
Commercial Register, extract from Swiss Commercial Register, copy of charter or equivalent
document).
49 See G. Friedli & L. Meyer, Die Vereinbarung liber die Sorgfaltspflicht der Banken in den
Jahren 1984 bis 1987, 40 WuR 163, 172 - 73 (1988) (Proceeding III) (fact that displayed identifica-
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been pointed out that the greatest possible anonymity for customers of
Swiss banks subject to the Agreement may be achieved through the use
of forged identification documents.50 Published precedent of the Over-
sight Board has also held that the Agreement neither expressly nor im-
plicitly requires bank officials to include in relevant customer records a
photocopy of the official identification as verification that the required
identification proofing has in fact occurred 1.5
2. Identification of Beneficial Owners.
In certain instances, a signatory bank's duty under the Agreement of
Due Care to identify potential contracting partners requires a further
duty to obtain from such partners a declaration on Form A (attached to
the Agreement) identifying actual beneficial ownership as to the relevant
assets.52 The declaration of Form A is required to be obtained whenever
serious doubt exists - prior to the opening of an account, a passbook or a
securities account, or prior to the carrying out a fiduciary transaction - as
to whether the contracting partner is himself the beneficial owner.53 The
Agreement silently assumes the existence of such doubt and requires a
Form A declaration of beneficial ownership in each case where banking
relations are established with a "domiciliary company," defined to in-
clude Swiss or foreign "institutions, corporations, foundations, trusts,
etc. that do not conduct a commercial or manufacturing business or
other form of commercial operation in the country where its registered
office is located."54 In such cases, a Form A declaration must be submit-
ted by the domiciliary company's authorized officers and must indicate
tion card was forged not relevant to whether bank had fulfilled duty of identification); id. at 177
(Proceeding V) (duty fulfilled through examination of official identification document alone; irrele-
vant if examined passport had expired validity date).
50 Komplizierter Kampf um Anonymitdt, Tages-Anzeiger, Dec. 9 1988, No. 288 at 35. See
Hdhere Efflzienz im Kampfgegen das organisierte Verbrechen, NZZ, Feb. 25/26, 1989, No. 47 at 25
(because of anonymous nature of modem mass banking transactions, banks were fully protected
from deceptive maneuvers, such as use of forged identification documents); Der Professor, der Staat-
sanwalt, der Politiker, Tages-Anzeiger, Nov. 27, 1989, No. 276 at 2 (statement of Swiss federal prose-
cutor) (duty of identification circumventable through use of forged passport).
51 See Friedli & Meyer, supra note 49, at 173 (Proceeding III) (failure of signatory bank to
photocopy forged identification card displayed to bank prior to opening of account not violation of
Agreement).
52 Id. at Art. 3 & Note 22.
53 Id. at Art. 3 & Note 21. Thus, a Form A declaration is presumably not required to be ob-
tained under such circumstances prior to the opening of a safe deposit box or the execution of a cash
transaction exceeding 100,000 Swiss francs.
54 Id. at Art. 4 para. 2. Automatically deemed "domiciliary companies" under the Agreement
are entities lacking their own business premises, exclusive staff, or exclusive staff which engages in
more than solely administrative tasks. Id. at Note 25. An exception to such duty exists where a
bank knows that the domiciliary company belongs to a specific group of enterprises, or is familiar
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the persons and/or entities in whom control of more than half of such
company's capital stock or voting power is vested, directly or indirectly,
or who otherwise recognizably exercises a decisive influence over the
company.55
In all other cases, only where "unusual circumstance" exist casting
doubt on the presumption that the bank's contracting partner is her or
himself the beneficial owner must a signatory bank obtain a Form A dec-
laration from its contracting partner which either confirms such part-
ner's status as a beneficial owner or, alternatively, identifies each third
party beneficial owner of the assets in question.56 According to an ex-
planatory note to the Agreement, such "unusual circumstances" may ex-
ist where (i) a power of attorney is granted in favor of someone lacking
recognizably close ties to the contracting partner, (ii) the assets submit-
ted or to be submitted appear disproportionate to the contracting part-
ner's known financial means or (ill) the opening of an account or
execution of a fiduciary transaction is requested through correspondence
by a person domiciled abroad not personally known to the bank.57
The full name, address and country of domicile of each third party
identified as a beneficial owner to a signatory bank by the bank's con-
tracting partner on a Form A or otherwise made known to the bank
through the course of business relations with the contracting partner
must be kept on file by the bank. 8 Should serious doubt as to the accu-
racy of a contracting partner's Form A declaration exist, and such doubt
is not dispelled through further clarification, the bank is then required to
refuse to proceed with the requested account opening or fiduciary trans-
action.59 Similarly, should a bank commence banking relations with a
with both the distribution of the company's capital stock and the identity of the individuals holding
controlling interests. Id. at Art. 4 para. 3.
55 Id. at Art. 4 para. 1 subpara. b & Note 27. See Die Sorgfaltspflicht aufdem Pn'fstand, NZZ,
Mar. 17, 1990, foreign ed. no. 63 at 33 (newly adopted legal duty of due care in identification makes
no differentiation between domiciliary companies and others; future applicability of Art. 4 of Agree-
ment questioned).
56 Id. at Art. 3 & Note 18.
57 Id. Such listing of specific "unusual circumstances" is not, however, intended to be
exhaustive.
58 Id. at Notes 19, 30 & 44. While not affecting the actual scope of banking secrecy provided
under the BankG, the Agreement has arguably increased the quality of the information which Swiss
banks are able to provide to law enforcement authorities in the event an exception to the banking
secrecy duty is available. E. CHAMBOST, DIE BANKGEHEIMNISSE DEN LNDERN IN DER WELT 51
(1982). But cf. infra note 50 and accompanying text.
59 Note 20, CDB 1987. Neither the text of the Agreement nor the explanatory notes thereto list
specific circumstances possibly justifying serious doubt as to the accuracy of a declaration of benefi-
cial ownership or explain what steps should be taken for the purpose of further clarification. See
Erste Fazit der neuen Sorgfaltspflicht Vereinbarung, NZZ, Sept. 27, 1990, no. 224 at 33. 34 (in recent
cases, Oversight Board left open question whether bank had duty to inquire into economic purpose
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contracting partner and subsequently discover that originally-submitted
information as to the beneficial owner was inaccurate or, alternatively, if
the transactions carried out at the contracting partner's request suggest a
deception as to the contracting partner's identity, the bank is then under
a duty to sever banking relations as quickly as possible.'
The Form A declaration has been criticized as being inadequate to
achieve its intended purpose, i.e., that of reliably identifying actual bene-
ficial ownership. First, the Agreement fails to provide concrete guide-
lines as to when "serious doubts" as to the accuracy of a Form A
declaration might be deemed to exist.61 Indeed, although signatory
banks were held in violation of the Agreement in two published proceed-
ings for failing to obtain Form A declarations, in neither proceeding was
it suggested that the mere obtaining of the Form A would not have per se
fulfilled the Agreement's duty of identification.62 The declaration of ben-
eficial ownership itself, however, merely calls for the confirming signa-
ture of the contracting partner that she/he or someone else is the actual
beneficial owner. No verifying documentation, e.g., bank statement or
confirmation of wire fund transfer, is required to be submitted in support
of such claim, nor is the contracting partner required in the declaration
to clarify the unusual circumstances giving rise, as an initial matter, to
the doubt as to the contracting partner's beneficial owner status. As a
legal matter, signatory banks may often be prevented from checking the
truth of a claim that a person resident outside Switzerland is actually the
beneficial owner.63 Allegedly, as a practical matter, signatory banks do
not normally even attempt to verify the accuracy of Form A declarations
naming a third party as beneficial owner, with the result that a con-
of transaction where client opened eleven savings accounts in her own name, each in the amount of
1,000 Swiss francs.
60 L. at Art 9 para. 2 & Note 55. Such duty to sever relations applies only to the extent no
criminal investigation has been commenced. Id at Art. 9 para. 3. This caveat was added in re-
sponse to criticism that the VSB 1977's requirement that banking relations be severed whenever
client funds were suspected to stem from illegal activities was inadvertently tailored to permit sus-
pected criminals to collect their funds and vanish. See Zulauf, supra note 6, at 85.
61 Cf CDB 1987, Note 18 (providing examples of circumstances giving ride to doubt triggering
initial duty to obtain Form A declaration). Further, apparently no duty whatsoever to obtain a
Form A exists with respect to individual cash transactions, such as money changing transactions,
regardless of the amount of the transaction. Cf. supra note 53.
62 See, eg., Klauser, supra note 38, at 289-91 (Proceeding II) (bank should have demanded
declarations of beneficial ownership from 25-year old foreigners, each wishing to deposit $300,000 in
$100 bills into personal accounts); Meyers, supra note 38, at 165 (Proceeding II) (bank should have
obtained Form A declaration from individual purporting to be director of foreign company and
wishing to deposit $30 million into personal account).
63 See, e.g. Schwaibold, supra note 6, at 237 (naming French citizen by Mafia member as benefi-
cial owner not capable of being proofed by bank in light of relevant French banking regulations); A.
Meili, Keine Unterstiitzung der Formular B1, 117 Der Schweizer Anwalt 21, 22-23 (1988) (same).
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tracting partner may successfully frustrate the purpose of such declara-
tion by naming a random, real or fictitious foreigner as beneficial
owner.64
3. Declarations of Members of Certain Professions
The hitherto most important and controversial exception to the
Agreement's duty of identification applies in the case of banking relations
commenced by certain Swiss professions acting on behalf of clients desir-
ing to remain anonymous vis-a-vis the bank.65 In such cases, the Agree-
ment allows Swiss attorneys and notaries, member firms of the Swiss
Union of Fiduciary and Auditing Firms, and individual members of the
Swiss Association of Certified Public Accountants, Trustees and Tax
Consultants to commence banking relations on behalf of third party bank
customers without revealing their client's identities to signatory banks. 66
As a substitute for disclosing the true customer's identity, the Swiss pro-
fessional is merely required under the Agreement to submit to the rele-
vant bank a declaration on Form B (attached to the Agreement) to the
effect that:
- The actual beneficial owner of the relevant funds or other prop-
erty is known to the professional;
- Having displayed due diligence, the professional is not aware of
any fact suggesting an abuse of the right to banking secrecy by
the true beneficial owner or, in particular, indicating that the
assets concerned are the fruits of any criminal activity;67
Further, under revisions to Form B in effect since March 31, 1989, mem-
bers of professions entitled to use Form B are also required to declare on
the Form that:
- The professional's appointment is not merely provisional in na-
ture and is not primarily aimed at keeping the beneficial owner's
name secret from the bank; and
- The professional will supervise the transactions made in the rele-
vant account and immediately inform the bank upon either the
64 See Die Sorgfaltspflicht aufdem Prz'fstand, supra note 55 (as matter of practice, Swiss banks
have merely satisfied themselves with the Form A declarations).
65 For other exceptions to the duty to identify customers, see supra notes 46 & 53. See also Art.
5 para. 3 & Note 42, CDB 1987 (no declaration of beneficial ownership required with respect to
accounts, securities accounts and fiduciary transactions commenced by Swiss banks, foreign banks
and finance companies of a banking nature which are SBA members).
66 Art. 5 para. 1, Notes 33 & 34, CDB 1987. Only attorneys, notaries, accountants or asset
administrators domiciled or with registered offices in Switzerland are eligible for such exception.
67 Id. at Art. 5 para. 2, Forms BI & B2.
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revocation or such person's appointment as such or a change in
the conditions upon which such declarations are based.6 8
The 1989 revisions to Form B additionally required Swiss attorneys and
notaries, on the one hand, to declare separately that:
- They are acting as legal counsel in accordance with their respec-
tive appointments as such;
- The account or securities account to be opened is directly related
to such appointment; and
- The purpose of the appointment as attorney or notary is not,
either directly nor indirectly, primarily that of managing
assets.69
Trustees and asset managers, for their part, also became required to sepa-
rately declare that:
- The relevant account is to be managed in accordance with a
power of attorney conferred by the beneficial owner or such
owner's representative; and
- The banking services in question "do not play an overriding role
in this regard."7 °
Should doubts arise subsequent to the commencement of banking
relations through a member of a privileged profession as to the accuracy
of such member's Form B declarations, a signatory bank is then required
under the Agreement of Due Care to demand a declaration of beneficial
ownership on Form A for the hitherto anonymous customer which iden-
tifies the actual beneficial owner of the relevant account. 71 If the thus-
obtained Form A declaration gives rise to doubt as to its correctness
which is not dispelled through further inquiry, the bank is then - presum-
ably - required to sever existing banking relations with the customer.72
68 Id. at Art. 5 para. 2, Note 37, Forms BI & B2.
69 Form BI, CDB 1987 (setting forth complete text of declaration of notaries and attorneys).
"Asset management" in this context has been described as the preservation and accumulation of
assets through technical and economic supervision. F. Thomann, Die Stellung des Anwaltes unter
der neuen Konvention and Ueberwachung seiner Funktion, 39 WuR 198, 206 (1987). Cf Decision of
the Second Public Law Division of December 29, 1986, BGE 112 lb 606, 608-9 (duty of professional
confidentiality of lawyers extends only to activities specific to legal profession; duty not applicable to
asset management or investment of client funds not bound up with normal legal mandate, such as
estate administration).
70 Form B2, CDB 1987 (setting forth complete text of declarations of trustees and asset manag-
ers). Banking services might be thus deemed to play an "overriding role" where a trustee or asset
manager were dependent on banking services for the fulfillment of an asset management contract, for
example, because the trustee lacks an independent infrastructure, correspondence contacts or a se-
curities trading license. Zuberbiihler, supra note 22, at 191.
71 Art. 9 para. 1, CDB 1987.
72 Such duty does not expressly exist under the Agreement. But cf id at Note 20 (requiring
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Evidence that a Swiss professional has abused his or her special status in
the opening of an account or arrangement of a fiduciary transaction may
be reported to competent disciplinary authorities by signatory banks if
such an act independently constitutes a breach of professional ethics.7"
The declarations required to be made by trustees and asset managers
under the 1989 revisions to Form B were initially objected to by members
of these professions as, in effect, rendering impermissible certain fiduci-
ary relationships otherwise recognized under Swiss civil and tax laws.74
Swiss attorneys and attorney organizations, for their part, objected,
among other things, to the fact that the expanded declarations required
of attorneys and notaries were much broader than the Form B represen-
tations required to be made by Swiss trustees and asset managers.75 This
anomaly has been justified with the argument that Swiss attorneys, unlike
Swiss asset managers and trustees, are under a duty in most cases to deny
testimony in civil and criminal investigations,76 thus rendering attorney
representation especially attractive to potential money launderers, not
only as a means of avoiding otherwise applicable bank identification re-
quirements, but also as a method of gaining an additional layer of legally
protected anonymity in the case of subsequent civil or criminal proceed-
ings.77 Nonetheless, as recently as last year, the influential Swiss Bar
bank to refuse to commence banking relations with bank customer should doubts as to accuracy of
customer's declaration of beneficial ownership not be dispelled through further inquiry).
73 See id. at Art. 12 para. 9 & Forms B1, B2 (member of privileged profession must acknowledge
possibility that evidence of breach of professional ethics will be reported to competent regulatory
authority by signatory banks, the SBA or supervisory agency set up under the Agreement). But see
infra notes 104-108 and accompanying text.
74 V. Mueller, Die Stellung des Treuhd'nders unter der Konvention und die Ueberwachung seiner
Funktion, 39 WuR 210, 215 (1987). See R.A. Schiirmann, Zum zehnjdhrigen Bestehen der
Sorgfaltspflichtvereinbarung, 61 STr 378, 379 (1987) (infringement on asset manager's constitutional
freedom to engage in trade and commerce, and on constitutional right to privacy of asset manager's
clients).
75 See, eg., A. Meili, supra note 63, at 22; Zwist im Anwaltsverband, NZZ, June 6, 1989, No. 128
at 35 (per Swiss Bar Association (Schweizer Anwaltsverband), Form BI declarations unclear, unjus-
tified and contrary to duty of attorney confidentiality). Swiss notaries did not register similar pro-
tests, perhaps because the latter are already subject to various disclosure duties under Swiss cantonal
supervisory laws. See supra note 26.
76 The duty of professional confidentiality of attorneys - described as "super secrecy" - is subject
to fewer exceptions and, therefore, is less penetrable, than even banking secrecy; nearly all cantonal
and federal criminal laws, and even certain cantonal civil laws, for example, restrict the right to
refuse testimony in criminal proceedings to persons bound to professional confidentiality under Art.
321, StGB, and thus withhold such right from persons bound only by banking secrecy. D. BODMER,
B. KLEINER & B. LuTz, KOMMENTAR ZUM BUNDESGESETZ OBER DIE BANKEN UND SPARKASSEN
Art 47, N. 40 (3rd rev. ed. 1986) (hereinafter D. BODMER).
77 Sellziehen um die Sorgfaltspflichtvereinbarung, NZZ, Dec. 14, 1988, No. 292 at 35;
Zuberbiihler, supra note 22, at 190. See Sorgfaltspflichtvereinbarung: Auf die Barrikaden, SHZ, Jan.
1, 1987, No. 3 at 2 (accusations as to quasi-sales by attorneys of their professional confidentiality
duty because less subject to exceptions than banking secrecy.)
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Association and several cantonal bar associations issued recommenda-
tions that their members use a narrower, alternative version of Form B
proposed by the Swiss Bar Association."
However, in the light of the new legal duty of due care in financial
transactions, the continued permissibility of the use of Form B is subject
to substantial doubt. Long suspicious as to the existence of Form B
abuse by "black sheep" within the attorney and trustee professions,79 the
Swiss Banking Commission has announced its view that Form B is not
under certain circumstances consistent with the new legal duty of due
care because Form B allows bank customers to shield their identity be-
hind an attorney or trustee80 . Accordingly, the Swiss Banking Commis-
sion recently informed the SBA and various trustee and attorney
organizations that if they fail to voluntarily abandon the Form B usage
then the Banking Commission will formally urge banks to do so by
means of a circular letter, and, if that fails, will issue a decree forbidding
banks from accepting Form B.8"
C. Enforcement of Agreement
A signatory bank's compliance with the provisions of the Agree-
ment of Due Care is controlled in the first instance by the independent
certified accountants appointed in accordance with the Bank Act, 2 who
are required to conduct Agreement compliance "spot checks" during the
regular auditing of accounts and to report findings as to actual and sus-
pected Agreement violations to both the Swiss Federal Banking Commis-
sion 3 and a special oversight board created under the Agreement (the
"Oversight Board" or "Board")84 . Each signatory bank's internal audit-
ing department is also responsible for verifying bank compliance with
78 Zwist ir Anwaltsverband, supra note 75. But cf id. (objections to stance of Swiss Bar Associa-
tion by certain cantonal bar associations; former's opposition to Form BI alleged to merely serve
interests of a handful of attorneys).
79 See Meili, supra note 63, at 23 (claims of Swiss Banking Commission regarding attorney mis-
use of Form B).
80 Das Verbot anonymer Bankkonten, NZZ, Sept. 6, 1990, No. 206 at 39. The new legal duty of
due care does not currently apply to banks as such but, rather, applies to individuals professionally
engaged in financial transactions. See infra note 156.
81 Id
82 See Arts. 18-22, BankG (Swiss banks required to appoint independent accountants certified by
the Swiss Federal Banking Commission to examine annual financial statements).
83 The Banking Commission must, in turn, consider whether the particular Agreement violation
also constitutes a violation of Art. 3 Sect. 2 subsect. c of the Bank Act. See infra notes 113-115 and
accompanying text.
84 Art. 10 para. 1 & Art. 12 para. 1, CDB 1987. The Oversight Board is composed of five
independent experts who are appointed by the SBA for five-year terms. Id at Art. 12 paras. I & 3.
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the Agreement. 5
Upon receiving notice as to possible violation of the Agreement
from a signatory bank's internal or independent auditors, a special inves-
tigator appointed by the SBA is required to investigate the alleged viola-
tion and recommend to the Board whether the commencement of a
proceeding and imposition of an equitable sanction would be appropri-
ate.8 6 The SBA investigator is also authorized to investigate and recom-
mend the commencement of proceedings based on information
independently derived from other sources, such as newspaper reports or
tips from bank customers.8 7
The Oversight Board is authorized to impose a fine of up to 10 mil-
lion Swiss francs with respect to violations of the Agreement by signatory
banks. 8 In determining the amount of such sanctions, the Board is re-
quired to take due account of the degree of culpability of the delinquent
bank, the bank's financial situation and the gravity of the Agreement
violation.89 A bank's failure to participate in an investigation under the
Agreement may in and of itself subject the uncooperative bank to a
fine.' Should a signatory bank refuse to pay the sanction imposed upon
it by the Oversight Board within the prescribed period of time, an arbi-
tration tribunal based in Basle may be charged with final adjudication as
to the matter in dispute if the SBA files a complaint.91
The Oversight Board, the SBA investigators and the arbitration tri-
bunal in Basle, as "authorized bank officers" within the banking secrecy
provisions of the Swiss Bank Act, are each strictly bound to treat as con-
fidential all facts made known to them during the course of Agreement
enforcement inquiries or proceedings.92 Even when a bank is found in
violation of the Agreement and required to pay a fine, the Board may not
impart such a fact to either signatory banks or the public at large.93 The
85 Such duty is implied under Note 16, CDB 1987, requiring a bank to ensure that both its
independent and internal auditors are in a position to verify bank compliance with required identifi-
cation procedures. Stbckli, supra note 37, at 447.
86 Art. 12 para. 2, CDB 1987. The SBA may appoint one or more such investigators. Id.
87 See P. Nobel, Die neuen Standesregeln zur Sorgfaltspflicht der Banken, 39 WuR 149, 163
(1987).
88 Art. 11 para. 1 & Art. 12 para. 4, CDB 1987. With respect to minor Agreement violations,
the Board is authorized to issue a reprimand in the place of monetary sanctions.
89 Id at Art. 11 para. 1. Fines collected from delinquent banks are to be allocated to a useful
public purpose and are, as a matter of Board practice, donated to the International Red Cross Com-
mittee. .ra; G. Friedli & L. Meyer, supra note 44, at 164.
90 Art. 12 para. 7, CDB 1987 (maximum fine of 10 million Swiss francs!).
91 Id. at Art. 13 para. 1.
92 Id. at Art. 12 para. 8 & Art. 13 para. 9. Thus, signatory banks may not invoke banking
secrecy vis-i-vis such parties. Id
93 M. AUBERT, J.P. KERNEN & H. SCHOENLE, DAs SCHWEIZERISCHE BANKGEHEIMNIS 176
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Board is nonetheless required to inform the Swiss Banking Commission
as to its decisions 94 and to periodically inform signatory banks as to the
general nature of its findings to the extent permitted by the rules of bank-
ing and business secrecy9". Accordingly, at regular three-year intervals
the Board has, without naming the banks or other parties involved, pub-
lished summaries of selected decisions under the Agreement.96
The internal and external auditor compliance reviews contemplated
under the Agreement as a primary means of patrolling compliance with
the duty of identification demonstrates several inadequacies. First, an
Agreement compliance review is merely required to be made as a "spot
check," and is made only in connection with a bank's annual auditing
review, with the broad range of other auditing tasks confronting bank
auditors under the Bank Act substantially reducing the amount of time
available for and, hence, the effectiveness of such Agreement spot
checks. 97 Further, certain aspects of the duty of identification laid out in
the Agreement are triggered by subjective, ill-defined elements, such as
the duty to obtain a Form A declaration or to break off banking rela-
tions, which hinges upon the existence of "unusual circumstances" giving
rise to "serious doubt" undispelled by "further clarification". 98 Applica-
tion of such concepts by bank auditors requires both a thorough knowl-
edge of individual case circumstances, which may not necessarily be
obtainable from relevant customer files, 99 together with a willingness to
confront bank management with perceived wrongdoings not capable of
objective assessment"°° .
(1978). See N. SCHMID, supra note 2, at 248 (according to Swiss Federal Council, no publication by
Board of names of delinquent banks necessary; Board's notice to Swiss Banking Commission suffi-
cient to protect public interest).
94 Art. 12 para. 9, CDB 1987.
95 Note 57, CDB 1987. The business secrecy provisions are set forth in Art. 167, StGB. See P.
HONEGGER, AMERIKANISCHE OFFENLEGUNGSPFLICHTEN IM KONFLIKT Mr SCHWEIzERISCHEN
GEHEIMHALTUNGSPFLICHTEN 151 f. (1986).
96 See generally Klauser, supra note 38; Meyer, supra note 38; Friedli & Meyer, supra note 44.
To date, 18 of the total 62 proceedings opened by the Board during 1977 and the end of 1987 have
been published. Friedli & Meyer, id at 164. Cf id. (of the 62 proceedings opened, 37 discontinued
and 24 resulted in imposition of fines).
97 Zuberbiler, supra note 21, at 176. Cf. Stockli, supra note 33, at 446 (time expenditure for
spot checks should be in appropriate proportion to time allotted for other auditing tasks). Further,
the duty of identification represents only one of the three major Agreement duties required to be
reviewed as to bank compliance. Cf supra note 41.
98 See supra notes 56 & 59 and accompanying text.
99 Cf. St6ckli, supra note 33, at 447 (formal Agreement violations easier to detect within scope of
regular bank auditing activities than substantive violations).
100 See Ziiberbuhler, supra note 21, at 176 (bank auditors likely to shy away from perceived
meddling or from playing a pioneer role with respect to complex questions of a legal or moral
nature).
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Not surprisingly, disciplinary proceedings against signatory banks
have generally, in the first instance, been opened on the basis of reports
surfacing in local newspapers rather than in response to information pro-
vided by bank auditors. 10 1 Moreover, the few violations of the Agree-
ment's duty of identification actually uncovered by bank auditors to date
have been mainly limited to technical violations of the duty in areas gov-
erned by clear and explicit rules.102
The Agreement's investigation and enforcement mechanisms them-
selves have no direct application with respect to the various Swiss profes-
sionals, who are, in certain cases, alone responsible for vouching as to the
required identification of contracting partners. While the Agreement
provides that the Board may inform appropriate disciplinary authorities
as to any Agreement breaches determined to have been committed by
members of privileged professions, when independently constituting a
breach of professional ethics, 103 the actual likelihood that evidence as to
Form B misuses may be discovered via normal Agreement investigate
channels is minimal. As an initial matter, Swiss professional may avail
themselves of certain precautionary tactics, such as dispersing client as-
sets among a large number of bank accounts, to prevent arousing suspi-
cion that their Form B declarations may be false.104 Swiss attorneys,
who are not pledged to abide by Agreement provisions,105 have allegedly
refused in the past, on grounds of attorney confidentiality, to identify
clients in whose banks accounts funds of dubious or criminal origin were
101 See infra note 120 and accompanying text. Cf Verpflichtung zur Information n'tig, Tages-
Anzeiger, Nov. 12, 1988, No.265 at 33 (investigation into laundering of over one million Swiss francs
through Swiss banks commenced by SBA investigator solely in response to newspaper reports;
neither Banking Commission nor Board informed of incident by responsible bank auditors). Cf, eg.,
Klauser, supra note 38, at 290 (Proceeding II) (Board alerted to "unusual circumstances" giving rise
to "serious doubt" through criminal prosecution against bank customers); Meyer, supra note 38, at
164 (Proceeding II) (Board alerted to "unusual circumstances" through bank's filing of fraud
charges against individual involved).
102 St6cldi, supra note 33, at 447 (Agreement violations hitherto uncovered by bank auditors
predominantly technical in nature).
103 Art. 12 para. 9, CDB 1987. Cf. M. Frey, Verfahrensordnung und Sanktionen unter der "VSB
1987", 63 STr 115, 121 (1989) (incorrect Form B representations may violate prohibition of Swiss
Penal Code on use of forged or falsified documents).
104 Cf, ag., Zuberbilhler, supra note 21, at 192 (doubts as to the accuracy of Form BI declara-
tions are justified where an attorney represents an unusually high number of clients, each possessing
inordinately large amounts of assets); accord W. MAURER, supra note 3, at 35 (customer's ability to
open accounts by numerous banks poses major hindrance to bank efforts to detect funds constituting
"dirty money").
105 Neither independent Swiss trustees and asset managers, nor Swiss attorney organizations,
such as the Swiss Bar Association, have voluntarily undertaken to adhere to the Agreement. Zulauf,
supra note 6, at 84.
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suspected to have been deposited1 °6. However, not even those profes-
sionals pledged to abide by Agreement provisions by virtue of member-
ship in a pledging organization, such as many assets managers and
trustees, 10 7 are required to submit themselves to either auditor "spot
checks" or compliance reviews by the SBA, the Board or professional
disciplinary authorities aimed at uncovering instances of Form B
misuses' ° 8.
The consequences suffered by banks adjudged to have violated the
Agreement are, under current practice of the Oversight Board, arguably
insufficient from both an economic and symbolic standpoint to deter
Agreement violations in the future. Although the Board is theoretically
authorized to impose equitable sanctions of up to 10 million Swiss francs
on signatory banks adjudged to have violated the Agreement, the mone-
tary sanctions imposed under Board decisions published to date have -
excepting one fine of 500,00 Swiss francs imposed during early enforce-
ment efforts - amounted to an average of only 45,000 Swiss francs even
though extensive bank profits were reaped in some cases through the
transactions which violated the Agreement. 9 The fines imposed by the
Board are not directed at individual bank officials, but solely at the banks
as such. 110 At the same time, the veil of anonymity surrounding Board
proceedings11' protects signatory banks for the most part from adverse
publicity stemming from an Agreement violation.
106 H"here Efflzienz im Kampf gegen das organisierte Verbrechen, supra note 50. See also P.
BERNASCONI, supra note 16, at 36.
107 Certain Swiss Trustee and Asset Management Professional Associations Have Voluntarily
Pledged to Abide by Agreement Provisions. See Zulauf, supra note 6, at 84 n. 5. See also 1986
RULES OF THE PROFESSIONAL COMMISSION, SWIss UNION OF FIDUCIARY AND AUDITING FIRMs
(1986 Reglement fiber die Standeskommission, Schweizerische Treuhands- und Revisionskammer),
Art. 28 paras. 3 & 6 (authorizing issuance of warning or reprimand, imposition of fines of up to one
million Swiss francs and/or exclusion from membership for Agreement violators).
108 Not surprisingly, according to officers of the Swiss Union of Fiduciary and Auditing Firms,
the latter association has yet to receive notice of member violations of the Agreement from either the
Board, SBA investigators or any other party. Cf. Thomann, supra note 69, at 219 (reporting of
Agreement violations to Swiss Union of Fiduciary and Auditing Firms possible since 1982).
109 See generally Klauser, supra note 38; Meyer, supra note 38; Friedli & Meyer, supra note 44.
Cf Meyer, supra note 38 at 166-67 (Proceeding III) (fine of 60,000 Swiss francs imposed on bank
found guilty of repeated violations of Agreement involving sums totalling 10 - 20 million Swiss
francs). The mildness of the imposed fines may be attributed to the fact that Board precedent has
required the amount of fines to be imposed on delinquent banks to be calculated without reference to
the existence and/or amount of actual profits realized by signatory banks in connection with Agree-
ment violations. See Friedli & Meyer, supra note 44 at 179 (Proceeding VII).
110 C. GRABER, supra note 8, at 161.
111 See, eg., supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
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IV. MONEY LAUNDERING AND DUTY oF DUE CARE UNDER
CURRENT Swiss LAW
A. Prior to New Legislation
Even prior to the passage of new legislation specifically criminaliz-
ing money laundering within Switzerland, both the lending of assistance
in laundering of illegally-obtained funds and the failure to exercise due
care in identifying bank customers were - at least in theory - punishable
in certain rare instances under provisions of already-existing Swiss
legislation.
1. Swiss Bank Act.
First, the Swiss Bank Act provision requires, as a prerequisite for
obtaining and holding a banking license, that the character and qualifica-
tions of both bank management and its board of directors be sufficient to
ensure bank conduct beyond reproach. 112 This provision has been held
to create a duty of due care for Swiss banks under the Bank Act - in-
dependent of the existence of a similar due care duty under the Agree-
ment - to clarify to the Swiss Banking Commission the economic
background of proposed banking transactions which are complicated,
unusual or significant in scope, or which appear immoral or illegal.113
Sanctions available to the Banking Commission for violations of the
Bank Act due care duty include the issuance of an order declaring a bank
in violation of such duty and/or requiring the transfer or replacement of
an executive employee 14 or, in the case of a reckless violation, revocation
of the delinquent bank's banking license115.
Both the Swiss Federal Tribunal and the Swiss Banking Commis-
112 Art. 3 Sect. II subsect. c, BankG '.... Gewihr fir eine einwandfrei Geschiftstlitigkeit").
113 See, e.g., Judgment of the Second Public Law Division of June 27, 1985, BGE 111 Ib 126,127
(bank required to produce documentation clarifying economic background of certain transactions;
transactions must be terminated if they appear to be illegal or immoral); Judgment of the Second
Public Law Division of June 25, 1982, BGE 108 lb 186, 191-193 (whether transactions "significant"
largely matter of discretion for Swiss Banking Commission); Judgment of the Second Public Law
Division of July 11, 1980, BGE 106 lb 145, 148 (main aim of transactions as to which bank was
required to provide clarification may have been to increase layers of anonymity shielding actual
beneficial owner).
114 Zuberbiihler, supra note 21, at 178.
115 Art. 23 quinquies Sect. I, BankG. A banking license, however, may be revoked by the Bank-
ing Commission only as an ultimo ratio. Judgment of the Second Public Law Division of June 25,
1982, supra note 114, at 191. See N. SCHMID, supra note 38, at 63; D. BODMER, supra note 76, at
Art. 23 quinquies N. 8. The Commission has yet to impose such a penalty in response to a bank's
violation of its due care duty under the BankG. Letter of the Acting Director of the Federal Bank-
ing Commission dated Nov. 14, 1989. See K. Hauri, Mdglichkeiten und Grenzen der Bankenaufsicht
in derSchweiz, 83 SJZ 321, 328 (1987) (banking permits revoked, on various other grounds, total of
17 times).
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sion have stressed that compliance with the Agreement's duty of due care
in identification should merely be viewed as a necessary minimum for
compliance with Bank Act's broader due care duty." 6 Realistically,
however, the Banking Commissions' staff - totalling around thirty per-
sons and, as a rule, fully occupied with routine administrative matters - is
ill-equipped for the assumption of an active investigatory role under the
Bank Act." 7 An active investigatory role is, indeed, not foreseen under
the Bank Act, which basically makes the Banking Commission's investi-
gation and enforcement activities dependent upon information as to pos-
sible Bank Act violations relayed to the Commission by relevant bank's
independent certified accountants."' Thus, until now the Banking Com-
mission has not had at its disposal adequate legal or practical means for
detecting and punishing a violation of the Bank Act's duty of due care
which is not first brought to its attention by bank accountants, SBA in-
vestigators or the Oversight Board." 9 As a factual matter, however,
only a minute percentage of the suspected Agreement violations thus far
investigated by the Board and/or SBA investigators has been based on
information stemming from independent or internal bank auditors. 120
A further limitation on the Bank Act duty of due care is that its
scope is limited to (i) actions taken by members of executive manage-
ment, within (ii) banks and finance companies of a banking nature sub-
ject to the permit requirements of the Bank Act. The former limitation
in particular undercuts the meaningfulness of the Bank Act due care
duty, because most Agreement violations are committed by the low-
ranking bank employees in customer service or asset management who -
unlike their respective superiors - come into contact with bank customers
116 See, e-g., Judgment of the Second Public Law Division of June 27, 1985, supra note 114, at
128; Judgment of the Second Public Law Division of June 3, 1983, BGE 109 lb 146, 153; Annual
Report of the Swiss Banking Commission 1988 (Jahresbericht der Eidgenbssischen Bankenkommis-
sion 1988), at 24. See also Zuberbiihler, supra note 21, at 180.
117 Drp'ckten Banken Beide Augen Zu?, supra note 40. See Hauri, supra note 115, at 324.
118 Zuberbiihler, supra note 21, at 176. An exception is set forth in Article 21 of the Regulations
of the Swiss Federal Council Concerning the Bank Act (Verordnung des Bundesrats zum
Bundesgesetz Uiber die Banken und Sparkassen, vom 17. Mai. 1972) (SR 952.02) (BankV), which
requires banks to report directly to the Banking Commission with respect to customer lendings in
excess of certain percentages of bank equity. See Zuberbiiler, iaL at 177 (development of Banking
Commission precedent under BankG duty of due care is due exclusively to the direct reporting
clump risks by banks).
119 The Banking Commission announced its intent to abolish the use of Form B, for example,
only after the existence of such abuses had been alleged in newspaper reports and by various legal
commentators for numerous years. Cf., eg., supra notes 77 & 104 and accompanying text.
120 Zuberbiihler, supra note 21, at 176; Zulauf, supra note 6, at 84; Nobel, supra note 88, at 163.
See Hdhere E0ffzienz in Kampf gegen das organisierte Verbrechen, supra note 50 (Banking Commis-
sion first informed of Bank Act violations after their concealment from public at large no longer
possible). See also supra note 101.
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on a daily basis.121 In the overwhelming majority of instances in the past
where a signatory bank was held to have violated the Agreement, the
Swiss Banking Commission did not commence an independent, more far-
reaching investigation into Bank Act due care issues largely because of
the failure of involved bank personnel to occupy executive management
positions.
122
Despite its insistence that a Swiss bank's acceptance of funds recog-
nizably stemming from criminal activities could constitute a violation of
the Bank Act's duty of due care, 123 the Swiss Banking Commission has
yet to hold a bank in violation of such duty based on a failure to exercise
due care to prevent the laundering of suspect funds 2 4 . An opportunity
to do so in the recent Lebanon Connection was denied the Banking Com-
mission - at least as an initial matter - because responsible bank employ-
ees in that case were not members of executive management.125
2. Swiss Narcotics Act of 195L
One provision of Swiss criminal law which has hitherto had only
limited relevance with regard to money laundering activities in Switzer-
land is the prohibition under the Swiss Narcotics Act of 1951 of the fi-
nancing of, and the procurement of financing for, illegal drug trade.
126
Above and beyond its facial limitation to assets stemming from illegal
drug trade, this prohibition has been limited by judicial precedence to
instances where it could be proven that laundered drug proceeds had
been reinvested in the illegal drug operation and, further, that the parties
effecting a particular money laundering transaction knew or must have
known that the proceeds were to be reinvested in this manner.127 Be-
121 Zuberbiihler, supra note 21, at 173. With respect to actions of lower-ranking bank personnel,
the Swiss Banking Commission's review under Art. 3 Sect. 2 subsect. c of the Bank Act is limited to
the question of whether top level bank management has exercised due care through its selection,
instruction and control of such personnel.
122 Zuberbihler, supra note at 21,at 185.
123 Zulauf, supra note 6, at 85.
124 The Banking Commission's pronouncements as to the content of the Bank Act duty of due
care have, in fact, often been criticized for their lack of specificity. See, ag., D. BODMER, supra note
76, at Art. 3 - 3 ter, N. 36; Zuberbihler, supra note 21, at 175 (citing critics).
125 See Keine bankengesetzlichen Massnahmen in der Geldwdscherei-Affdre, NZZ, Apr. 12, 1989,
No. 84 at 33 (no violation of BankG; business relations between Lebanon Connection money laun-
derers and bank's currency trading and precious metals departments maintained at hierarchically-
low level). The Banking Commission has recently demanded that a bank's executive management be
required to make a decision on the basis of clear guidelines as to the continuance of business rela-
tions should "questionable circumstances" arise. Dubiose Gelder ir 'Hart der Gnomen'?, NZZ, Dec.
9/10, 1989, No. 287 at 33.
126 Bundesgesetz vom 3. Oktober 1951 fiber die Betiiubungsmittel (SR 812.121) (BetmG), Art. 19
Part 1 Sect. VII.
127 C. GRABER, supra note 8, at 91 (citing decisions). Contingent criminal intent, or dolus even-
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cause of the difficulties associated with obtaining such proof, the Narcot-
ics Act's financing prohibition has not, until now, assumed a significant
role in hindering the laundering of illegal drug proceeds in Switzerland.
In connection with recent criminal prosecution arising out of the
Lebanon Connection12 , however, the scope of the Narcotic Act's appli-
cation to money laundering operations has been significantly expanded to
include, under certain circumstances, the laundering of money directly
stemming from illegal drug trade (so-called "first-degree" money laun-
dering), independent of proof that the laundered funds were then rein-
vested in the purchase of illegal drugs12 . Specifically, the Federal
Tribunal ruled that the prohibition of the Narcotics Act may be applied
to first-degree money launderers who know or assume the risk that their
actions will directly or indirectly contribute to trafficking in illegal drugs
and who have a close enough connection to the illegal drug operations to
be viewed as accomplices or accessories to the drug trade.' 30 On the
other hand, it need not be proven that such persons knew details con-
cerning either the illegal drug trade operations or the specific persons
involved therewith. 131 The Federal Tribunal left undecided whether or
not the Narcotic Act's financing prohibition would be violated by the
reinvestment in normal business transactions of already-laundered funds
stemming from illegal drug trade (i.e., "second degree" money launder-
ing). 132  Subsequent to the Federal Tribunal's decision, two prominent
figures in the Lebanon Connection drama - Lebanese money traders -
were each sentenced to four-and-a-half years in prison for violating the
Act's financing prohibition. The Jury Court of Bellizona held that the
brothers had engaged in the laundering of proceeds which they knew
stemmed from illegal drug trade, and thereby could have indirectly con-
tualis, which equates to something more than reckless knowledge, has been held to be a necessary
element of the Narcotics Act's prohibition on financing drug trade. Judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals of Jan. 11, 1985, BGE 111 IV 28, 30. See P. NOLL & S. TRECHSEL, SCHWEIZERISCHES
STRAFRECHT ALLGEMEINER TEIL I: ALLGEMEINE VORAUSSETZUNGEN DER STRAFBARKEIT 87
(1986) (contingent criminal intent exists where misdoer knew or assunied the concrete facts consti-
tuting the objective crime and, further, desired or at least accepted the fact that the crime would be
completed).
128 See Brider Magharian Anklage erhoben, Tages-Anzeiger, Dec. 6 1989, No. 284 at 9 (charges
of violating Narcotics Act financing prohibition brought against persons involved in Lebanon Con-
nection by Bellinzona public prosecutor).
129 Judgment of the Court of Cassations of October 27, 1989, Praxis des Bundesgerichtes 79-39,
153 if., at 155. The Federal Tribunal's ruling was based in part on the Swiss Federal Council's
pronunciations in connections with Switzerland's 1968 ratification of the Uno Convention Against
Drug Abuse.
130 Id. at 156-58.
131 Id. at 158.
132 Id at 157.
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tributed to the introduction into trade of additional cocaine.
133
3. Receiving Stolen Goods.
Another provision of Swiss criminal law tangentially applicable to
the laundering of illegally-obtained assets is the Swiss Penal Code's pro-
hibition of the receiving of stolen goods, i.e., the acquisition, acceptance
as a gift or security deposit, or selling of an object acquired through a
criminal act by a person who was or must have been aware of the crimi-
nal origin of the object.13 1 It is generally accepted that a necessary ele-
ment of this crime is that the "received goods" be acquired through a
crime against property (Verm6gensdelikt), 135 such as theft, robbery,
fraud and blackmail 136 . This limitation, however, excludes those crimes
lacking a direct victim, such as illegal drug or weapons trade, prostitu-
tion and gambling, which constitute by far the most widespread
"branches" of professional money laundering.137 It is also generally ac-
cepted that the crime of receiving stolen goods does not encompass the
receiving of surrogate stolen goods, i.e., goods stemming only indirectly
from a property crime.13 8 Thus, it is open to question, where the booty
from a property crime is in the form of cash, as to whether the receiving
of such cash is prohibited in instances where the funds' original form has
already been altered, such as through a money changing transaction.
1 39
133 Je viereinhalb Jahre Zuchthaus fufr die Geldhandler Maghanians, Tages-Anzeiger, Sept. 14,
1990, No. 213 at 1 (decision as-yet-unpublished; reasons for judgment delivered orally).
134 Art. 144 Sect. I, StGB (Hehlerei). Contingent criminal intent (dolus eventualis) is also a pre-
requisite for this crime. H. walder, Die Hehlerei gemdss StGB Art. 144 - Kasuistik und Lehren, 103
ZStrR 233, 266 (1986).
135 See, eg., Judgment of the Court of Appeals of October 3, 1975, BGE 101 IV 402, 405;
STRATENwERTH BTI, supra note 26, at Sect. 15, N. 6; Messerli, supra note 1, at 427; P. BERNAS-
coN1, supra note 16, at 38; Walder, supra note 130, at 249; C. GRABER, supra note 8, at 74.
136 The exact crimes qualifying as "property crimes" appears to be a matter of some dispute. Cf,
eg., Judgment of the Criminal Assizes Court of Lugano of November 1, 1980 (Corte delle Assise
Criminali in Lugano), cited in P. BERNASCONI, supra note 16 at 32 n. 6 (kidnapping constitutes
property crime within meaning of Art. 144, StGB); accord P. BRAILLARD, DER FINANZPLATZ
SCHWEIZ: REGIERUNGSPOLITIK UND INTERNATIONAL KONKURRENZFAHIGKErr 98 (1987) (kid-
napping ransoms paid to terrorists not proceeds of property crime). See Vorgeschlagener
Geldwscher-Artikel ist zu schwach, Tages-Anzeiger, Aug. 26, 1989, No. 197 at 9 (misappropriation
constitutes property crime; murder and bribery do not).
137 C. GRABER, supra note 8, at 77. Cf G. Arzt, Das schweizerische Geldwdschereiverbot im
Lichte amerikanischer Erfahrung, 106 ZStrR 160, 161 (1989) (majority of laundered money stems
from illegal drug trade).
138 See, ag., C. GRABER, supra note 8, at 79; Walder, supra note 135, at 246-47.
139 See C. GRABER, supra note 8, at 80; P. BERNASCONI, supra note 16, at 38 (terrorist who
physically lays hold to robbery proceeds punishable; accomplice who receives bank deposit certifi-
cate purchased with robbery proceeds not punishable).
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4. Acting As Accessory After the FacL
Further, Article 305 of the Swiss Penal Code punishes persons act-
ing as an "accessory after the fact," i.e., persons who act to either shield
someone from criminal prosecution, criminal enforcement measures or
mandatory institutionalization, or to prevent, through the "hushing-up"
of a crime, the commencement of a criminal investigation." The appli-
cability of this crime to money laundering, however, is hindered by the
fact that actions may not be punishable if merely aimed at preventing the
confiscation or seizure of crime proceeds or goods - as are most launder-
ing transactions - rather than protecting a person from criminal prosecu-
tion. 141 Moreover, the scope of the crime of acting as an accessory after
the fact has been judicially limited to actions taken to frustrate the en-
forcement and prosecution efforts of Swiss legal officials, but not those of
non-Swiss legal officers.142 The overwhelming majority of laundering
transactions effected in Switzerland, however, involve dirty money stem-
ming from crimes committed and subject to prosecution outside Switzer-
land. 143 The crime of acting as an accessory after the fact does not,
therefore, have much practical significance with respect to the majority
of money laundering transactions effected in Switzerland.
5. Confiscation of Crime Proceeds.
An effective struggle against international crime depends, in large
part, on the ability of legal officials to confiscate the proceeds which stem
from a crime.144 Swiss law, however, currently requires concrete proof
linking the particular proceeds to be confiscated to the individual crimi-
140 Art. 305 Sect. I, StGB (Begiinstigung). See Judgment of the Court of Appeals of May 13,
1977, BGE 103 IV 98, 100; Judgment of the Court of Appeals of December 21, 1973, BGE 99 IV
266, 277; G. STRATENWERTH, SCHWEIZERISCHES STRAFRECHT, BESONDERER TEIL II:
STRAFrATEN GEGEN GEMEININTERESSEN 320 (1984) (hereinafter STRATENWERTH BTII).
141 Cf C. GRABER, supra note 8, at 83 (not punishable unless also intended to shield the perpetra-
tor from criminal prosecution); accord Messerli, supra note 1, at 427 (Art. 305 StGB also prohibits
actions aimed primarily at rendering difficult the seizure or confiscation of crime proceeds and in-
tended only indirectly, if at all, to shield criminal actor from prosecution).
142 Judgment of the Court of Appeals of October 13, 1978, BGE 104 IV 238, 240-243 (Swiss
crime of accessory after fact not applicable to concealment in Switzerland of murderer sought in
West Germany; crime only intended to protect efforts of Swiss justice administration). See L
HAUSER & J. REHBERG, STRAmFEcHT IV: DELIKTE GEGEN DIE ALLGEMEINHErr 310 (1989). An
exception is expressly foreseen in the case of certain especially serious underlying crimes committed
outside Switzerland, such as mass murder or war crimes. Art. 305 Sect. I bis, StGB.
143 Geldwscherek Nach Art der Indianer, supra note 15 (quoting P. Bernasconi). See Geldwds-
cherei als Rechtspflegedelikt?, NZZ, Nov. 22, 1989, No. 272 at 23 (issue of money laundering in-
volves, in first instance, proceeds from crimes committed outside Switzerland).
144 See C. GRABER, supra note 8, at 94.
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nal act or acts. 145 In the context of illegal drug trade, this in effect re-
quires proof linking each sum of money to be confiscated to a concrete
drug transaction.t14 Further, certain features unique to American crimi-
nal law, in particular the permissibility of plea bargaining, may tend to
create proof-related obstacles to the ability of Swiss courts to recognize,
on the basis of the American judgment, the relationship between the par-
ticular sum of money to be confiscated and the particular drug
transaction. 147
B. Under New Legislation
L Background.
Draft legislative proposals to render money laundering transactions
criminally punishable in Switzerland, through supplements to the Swiss
Penal Code's prohibition against acting as an accessory after the fact,
were first presented to the Swiss Federal Council in spring 1987 by ap-
pointed expert Paulo Bernasconi, former chief prosecuting attorney in
the Canton of Tessin, within the scope of ongoing efforts to revise the
Swiss Criminal Act concerning Property (Verm6"gensstrafrecht).141 Sub-
sequent to the November 1988 allegations about the key role several ma-
jor Swiss banks held in the Lebanon Connection money laundering
scandal and the indirectly-induced resignation of a Swiss Federal Council
member, the Federal Council determined to subject the money launder-
ing legislation to an accelerated enactment process, independent of the
more slow-moving revisions to the Criminal Act Concerning Property. 49
Subsequently, preliminary money laundering proposals were adopted by
145 lit at 95.
146 Id. One Zurich district court attorney summarized the current Swiss proof rules as requiring,
for example, that: "... on November 27, 1989,.. the American drug dealer M. accepted a certain
amount of cocaine from his Columbian supplier in Tampa, Florida, which he gave to certain fellow
Americans on the same day, who in turn sold the cocaine in St. Louis, Atlanta and New Orleans,
and turned the proceeds over to M., who then ran immediately to the bank in Tampa and had
exactly the same amount of proceeds transferred to his bank account in Switzerland, where receipt of
such amount was credited to the account." Id. at 96, n. 208 (citing P. Gasser, Weltwoche, Aug. 24,
1989).
147 C. GRABER, supra note 8, at 95-6 (doubt whether judgment entered as result of plea bargain-
ing would satisfy current proof of guilt requirements of Swiss law).
148 P. BERNASCONI, DiE GELDWASCHEREI IM SCHWEZMERSCHEN STRAFRECHT, BERICHT MIT
VORSCHLXGEN ZU EINEM NEUEN ARTIKEL 305 BIS STGB (1986), reprinted in Messerli, supra note
1, at 420 (hereinafter BERICTrr).
149 Bundesrat schldgt Doppell"sung gegen die Geldwdscherei vor, Tages-Anzeiger, May 11, 1989,
No. 97 at 1. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text. To further this goal, the Federal Council
also decided to appoint an expert commission to study and improve the Bernasconi proposals prior
to their consideration by the Federal Council. Id.
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the Swiss Federal Council in June 1989,15° ratified without change five
months later by a majority of the Swiss House of Representatives (Na-
tionalrat),151 and ratified unanimously without change by the Swiss Sen-
ate (Stdnderat) in March 1990152. The new legislation went in effect on
August 1, 1990.153
2. Text of New Legislation.
The new legislation, part of the Swiss Penal Code, makes it a crime,
subject to up to three years in prison (Gefidngnis)'54 and/or a fine, 155 for
any person 156 to execute a transaction which could frustrate the determi-
nation of origin, discovery or forfeiture of assets where such person
"knew or must have assumed" that the assets in question stemmed from
a crime, including a crime committed outside Switzerland157 . Whether
or not an act committed outside Switzerland constitutes a "crime" is to
be judged under Swiss law.15 8 The phrasing "knew or must have as-
sumed" requires dolus eventualis, or contingent criminal intent. 15 9 In
cases where the person convicted of the crime acted out of profit-seeking
150 See supra note 31.
151 Nationalrat ratifiziert Geldwdschereiartikel, NZZ, Nov. 29, 1989, No. 278 at 21.
152 Stdnderat verabschiedet Strafrechtsnoremen gegen die Geldwdscherei, NZZ, Mar. 21, 1990,
foreign ed. no. 66 at 25.
153 AS 1990 I 1077ff, 1078.
154 Under the Penal Code, unless specified otherwise, one may be confined in prison from one day
to three months, cf Art. 39 Para. 1 (Haft), from three days to three years, ef Art. 36, StGB
(Geflingnis), or from one to twenty years, cf Art.35, StGB (Zuchthaus). See G. STRAT NWERTH,
SCHWEIZERISCHES STRAFREcHT, ALLGEMEINER TElL II: STRAFEN UND MASSNAHMEM, Sect. 3,
N. 4-5 (1989) (hereinafter STRATENwERTH ATII) (informally and formally as well, punishment of
Zuchthaus leaves stronger taint than any other criminal sanction).
155 Where the text of the Penal Code sets forth a fine and a type of imprisonment penalty in the
alternative, as the original text does here, the Swiss judge is allowed to impose both a fine and
imprisonment penalty. Art. 50 Sect. II, StGB. See STRATENWERTH ATII, supra note 154, at 175.
156 It is a basic principle of Swiss criminal law that only natural persons (and not legal entities)
can commit a crime. P. NOLL, SCHWEIZERIsCHES STRAFREcHT ALLGEMEINER TEIL 1124 (1981).
Legal entities may be subjected to criminal law (in the sense of a fine) only if the application of the
penalties to legal entities is expressly provided for. Id.
157 Art. 305 bis Sect. I, StGB. The provision is triggered only where the laundered assets stem
from a crime which may be punished with a term of imprisonment (Verbrechen), as opposed to a
mere fine. STRATENWERTH ATII, supra note 154, at Sect. 4, N. 8.
158 BOTSCHAFr, supra note 31, at 1082, 1087. See C. GRABER, supra note 8, at 164 n. 286.
159 Art. 18 Sect. I, StGB. See supra note 127. The majority of the expert commissioners ap-
pointed to propose draft money laundering legislation had proposed the punishment of persons ef-
fecting money laundering transactions with reckless, rather than actual, knowledge as to the
criminal origin of the laundered funds. C. GRABERSUpra note 8, at 101. This proposal was heatedly
criticized by the SBA and SBA members. See, eg., Geldwdscherek Nichtsgelernt, SHZ, Oct. 8, 1987,
No. 41 at 1 (letter of SBA submitted to Swiss Federal Council member in protest of reckless money
laundering provision); Die Geldwdseherei wirksam bekiimpfen - aber wie?, SHZ, June 1, 1989, No. 22
at 7.
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motives - as is presumably the case with respect to most money launder-
ers - there is no ceiling on the amount of fine a Swiss judge may impose;
in most other cases, the maximum imposable fine is 40,000 Swiss
francs."6 Increased penalties - up to five years in prison together with
fine a of up to 1 million Swiss francs - are foreseen in instances where the
person convicted of the crime (i) acted as a member of a criminal organi-
zation, (ii) acted as a member of a band formed to systematically engage
in money laundering activities, or (iii) achieved a large turnover or con-
siderable profits through the laundering of money on a professional
basis.1 61
In a separate section applicable only to persons professionally en-
gaged in the acceptance, safeguarding, investment or transfer of third
party assets, the new legislation authorizes the imposition of up to one
year in prison and/or a fine162 for failure to exercise the due care neces-
sary, under the circumstances, to establish beneficial ownership with re-
spect to such assets163 . This legal duty of due care applies regardless of
whether the handled assets stem from a crime. In contrast to the Agree-
ment of Due Care, the due care duty does not apply to banks as such but,
rather, extends to all individual members of Switzerland's financial com-
munity, e.g., business attorneys, finance managers, investment advisers,
trustees and employees at banks, finance companies, bureaux de change
and other popular non-bank vehicles for routing suspect money into es-
tablished Swiss financial channels. 164
V. EFFECTIVENESS OF NEW LEGISLATION
Although the new money laundering legislation was enacted with
unprecedented swiftness, Swiss legislators at the same time recognized
that such legislation did not represent the most effective means possible
for hindering money laundering in Switzerland but, rather, represented a
politically-feasible and immediate solution.165
160 Art. 48 clause Sect. I - II, StGB (where text of legislation does not expressly provide other-
wise, maximum fine of 40,000 Swiss francs; unlimited fine where perpetrator acted out of profit-
seeking motives).
161 Art. 305 bit Sect. II, StGB. Theoretically, where a person convicted of money laundering acts
out of profit-seeking motives but does not fulfill any of the conditions triggering increased penalties,
the judge is actually free to impose a higher fine than the maximum fine of one million Swiss francs
foreseen for aggravated instances of money laundering. Cf. supra note 160 and accompanying text.
162 As is the case under new Article 305 bis Sect. I, StGB, the maximum imposable fine is 40,000
Swiss francs unless the perpetrator acted out of profit-seeking motives.
163 Art. 305 ter, StGB.
164 See BOTSCHAFT, supra note 31, at 1088.
165 See, eg., Stdnderatskommissionfiir Geldwdschereiartikel, NZZ, Feb. 28, 1990, foreign ed. no.
48 at 29 (Senate Commission advised Senate to adopt legislation; "preferable to have the second best
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Money laundering as such is prohibited under the new Swiss legisla-
tion only to the extent that the person or persons involved acted with the
knowledge or under the assumption that the laundered assets stemmed
from a crime.166 This criminal intent limitation was imposed in defer-
ence to the fact that the Swiss Penal Code does not, as a rule, punish acts
of mere negligence or recklessness.' 67 Legislators and commentators
alike pointed out that, among other things, it would be illogical and un-
fair to punish recklessness in connection with the laundering of money
stemming from a crime where commission of the underlying crime itself
required a higher standard of criminal intent. 168 Moreover, they noted
that a standard of recklessness in the context of money laundering would
be conceptually difficult for courts to apply, would lead to arbitrary ver-
dicts because of the standard's necessarily case-by-case application and,
ultimately, would cause massive legal uncertainty in the handling of
third party assets. 169 Moreover, because charges of prohibited money
laundering would be dependent, in each case, on conclusive proof - pre-
sumably through a final determination of guilt - that the assets in ques-
tion stemmed from a crime, it was first argued that a criminal judge's
determination of recklessness would be unduly guided by his after-the-
fact knowledge that such assets were indeed "tainted"' 70 and, second,
that final judicial determinations of guilt with respect to crimes commit-
ted in foreign countries would not always be available, thus resulting in
arbitrary verdicts 71.
now rather than the best later or never" ('lieber das Zweitbest jetzt als das Beste spiter oder rle"));
Stiinderat verabschiedet Strafrechtsnormen gegen die Geldwdscherei, supra note 152 (per Federal
Council President Koller, new legislation not final solution). Cf Nitiger aber nicht hinreichender
Schritt, NZZ, Mar. 22, 1990, foreign ed. no. 67 at 15 (under original plan, legislation would have
been enacted effective 1997, at the earliest).
166 This approach, contrary to the recommendations made by the expert commission appointed
to study the issue, whereunder recklessness knowledge would also have been punished, was heralded
with obvious relief by the SBA and its members. Geldwdschere" die Banken atmen auf, Tages-
Anzeiger, May 11, 1989, No. 97 at 33.
167 See Art. 18 para.l, StGB (unless expressly provided otherwise, prohibited acts only punish-
able if perpetrator possessed criminal intent). See also P. NOLL & S. TRECHSEL, supra note 127, at
80 (only especially valuable legal rights, such as life, health and community property rights, pro-
tected against acts of negligence); Bundesrat schldgt Doppell6sung gegen die Geldwdcherei vor, supra
note 149 (punishment of recklessness thought to be contrary to Penal Code's principle of certainty).
168 See, eg., Bundesrat schl'gt Doppelldsung gegen die Geldwscherei vor, supra note 149;
Grobfahrldssige Geldwdscherei- ein bankrechtliches Kuckucksei im Nest des Strafrechts?, NZZ, April
29/30, 1989, No. 99 at 33; C. GRABER, supra note 8, at 103.
169 Grobfahrssige Geldwdcherei -ein bankrechtliches Kuckucksei im Nest des Strafrechts?, supra
note 168. See also Der Professor, der Staatsanwalt, der Politiker - alle uneins, supra note 50 (opinion
of criminal law professor G. Stratenwerth).
170 Grobfahrlssige Geldwdscherei - ein bankrechtliches Kuckucksei im Nest des Strafrechts?,
supra note 168.
171 Geldwdscherei als Rechtspflegedelikt?, supra note 143 (no "final determination of guilt" avail-
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However, proving criminal intent in connection with money laun-
dering transactions can be a difficult if not impossible task.172 In recogni-
tion of this, Swiss legislators enacted a legal duty of due care in the
identification of beneficial ownership, applicable to all persons who pro-
fessionally handle third party assets, pursuant to which instances of neg-
ligence are punishable regardless of whether or not the handled assets
stem from a crime. Originally, it was thought that such a duty would be
easier for courts to apply and would result in less arbitrary verdicts than
would a prohibition on reckless money laundering, primarily because of
the concrete rules already established under the Agreement of Due Care
and precedence of the Oversight Board.17 3 The Banking Commission,
however, recently indicated that, in its view, the legal duty of due care on
the part of employees at Swiss banks would not be satisfied through the
acceptance by such employees of Form B from attorneys, trustees and
asset managers in lieu of the names and addresses of the actual beneficial
owners, as permitted under the Agreement of Due Care.174
It is, therefore, likely that the duty of due care specified in the
Agreement will not constitute, in every instance, a safe harbor for com-
pliance with the new legal duty of due care. This may have both positive
and negative consequences. On the positive side, it is doubtful whether
the Agreement's rules go far enough and are precise enough to facilitate
the detection of money laundering transactions.175 A close examination
of the Agreement and Board precedence reveals that the rules established
thereunder are, in certain key areas, vague and open to interpretation, 17 6
and that these areas have yet to be adequately interpreted by the Over-
able, e.g., in American cases concluded through plea bargaining; verdict as to reckless money laun-
dering would resemble high-stakes roulette game). It should be noted that this objection applies
equally in cases where intentional money laundering is alleged.
172 As has been repeatedly pointed out by various Swiss white collar crime experts, persons in-
volved in effecting financial transactions often purposefully refrain from posing questions as to the
origin of the funds in question. See Der Professor, der Staatsanwalt der Politiker - alle uneins, supra
note 50 (criminal prosecutor Corboz); Geldwdschere& Nach der Art der Indianer, supra note 15 (for-
mer Tessin chief prosecuting attorney Bernasconi).
173 See, eg., Die Geldwdscherei wirksam bekd'mpfen - aber wie?, supra note 159 (likely that bound-
aries of legal duty of due care no greater than those set under Agreement; Swiss banks would fight
against requirements going beyond current Agreement requirements).
174 Das Verbot anonymer Bankkonten, supra note 80. See also C. GRABER, supra note 8, at 200-
01 (questioning whether legal duty of identification should apply only in the case of cash transactions
in excess of a certain sum, as under the Agreement).
175 Cf Nationalrat ratiziert Geldwscherartikel, supra note 151 (remark by House of Representa-
tives member that Lebanon Connection was neither detected nor avoided, despite compliance with
Agreement by relevant Swiss banks.)
176 See, eg., supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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sight Board177 . Moreover, even in certain areas where the Agreement's
rules are concrete and detailed, they are at the same time subject to loop-
holes allowing their ready circumvention by sophisticated and business-
savvy representatives of organized crime.178
On the other hand, while the existence of a legal duty of due care
with undefined boundaries would, arguably, have the undeniably desira-
ble effect of spurring Swiss businessmen into inquiring as to the source of
suspicious funds whose origins might otherwise be discretely ignored,179
it could result in exactly the type of legal uncertainty and arbitrary ver-
dicts which Swiss legislators had sought to avoid when seeking an alter-
native to punishing reckless money laundering.
According to some, the exact scope and meaning of most crimes in
Switzerland, whether requiring actual knowledge or recklessness,18 0 is
first determined in any event through the practice of criminal prosecu-
tion authorities and by means of judicial interpretation.18' In the present
case, however, it is questionable whether adequate enforcement means
are available to ensure that the new prohibition against intentional
money laundering and its companion duty of due care in identification do
not end up becoming mere "dead-letter" legislation. As in the recent
past with respect to legislation criminalizing insider trading,1 8 2 the Swiss
Parliament appears once more to have enacted legislation - this time with
respect to money laundering - without giving due consideration to practi-
cal enforcement concerns. Despite the fact that the legal duty of due
care in financial transactions, for example, applies to persons active in
177 The important Agreement concept of "serious doubt under the circumstances," for example,
has yet to be clarified by the Oversight Board. Die Sorgfaltspflicht aufdem Przafstand, supra note 55.
178 Cf., eg., supra notes 49 -51 & 64 and accompanying text.
179 See also Zulauf, supra note 6, at 89 (lack of detailed due care "checklist" would avoid real
danger of fossilization of minimum due care standard into maximum due care standard).
180 For example, criminal penalties are foreseen for acts of recklessness or negligence in four
different instances under the Bank Act, including with respect to violations of the Bank Act's bank-
ing secrecy provisions. See Geldwdscherei-Artikel Zwischen Kochgang und Schongang, SHZ, Jan. 1,
1989, No. 1 at 5.
181 Wdschtjetzt das Recht die Schweiz rein?, Tages-Anzeiger, Nov. 27, 1989, No. 276 at 2. This
conclusion is not obvious within a country with a codified legal system, such as Switzerland.
182 Insider trading, analogous from an enforcement standpoint to money laundering, was de-
clared a criminal act as of July 1, 1988, without the simultaneous creation of either a federal or
catonal agency to supervise Swiss securities markets and detect possible cases of insider trading. See
A. Baumgartner, Insider Trading Ahndung in der Schweiz, 63 STr 428 (1989). The Zurich Cantonal
Department for White Collar Crime has expressed the view that the insider trading legislation was
prematurely enacted insofar as structures enabling a quick and economical investigative process were
not yet at hand. Teileinstellung eines Zzrcher Insiderverfahrens, NZZ, Mar. 31, 1990, foreign ed. no.
75 at 21. See also Falsche Dollars und Verkaufvon Leasing-Autos, NZZ, Spet. 12, 1990, No. 211 at
23 (according to head of Zurich white collar crime department, insider trading investigations de-
mand disproportionately large time expenditures).
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both bank and non-bank finance intermediaries, Swiss legislators have
neglected to subject non-bank finance intermediaries to the supervisory
control of an agency or other authority comparable to the Swiss Banking
Commission or the Oversight Board.' Further, unlike requirements
currently in force in the United States,184 Japan's1 and being introduced
in European Community member states,'86 the new money laundering
measures adopted in Switzerland do not require Swiss banks and other
handlers of third party assets to report certain types of financial transac-
tions, such as those exceeding a stipulated cash threshold or which ap-
pear to be connected with criminal acts, to the local criminal authorities.
Such a reporting duty would, of course, conflict with the jealously-
guarded Swiss banking secrecy and professional confidentiality provi-
sions of the Swiss Bank Act and Penal Code. However, even if such a
reporting duty did exist, it is unclear whether Switzerland's presently un-
derstaffed police and other law enforcement agencies would be able to
cope with the resulting added administrative burden.18 7
According to one commentator, money launderers can seldom be
tracked down by justice officials in the country where the laundering
transactions are effected without an "initial spark" from the country in
which the principal crime has been committed.18  A important side ef-
fect of the legislation will be to provide foreign legal officers with a basis
for breaking down Swiss banking secrecy barriers when seeking judicial
assistance in connection with cross-border money laundering operations.
Under Swiss federal law and the various treaties entered into by Switzer-
land concerning mutual assistance in criminal matters, Swiss authorities
may grant judicial assistance to a requesting country only with respect to
acts which constitute a crime not only under the laws of the requesting
183 Cf Hdrhere Effzienz im Kampfgegen die Geldwdschere supra note 50 (demand by Banking
Commission that its supervisory authority be extended to include finance companies, trustees and
asset mangers).
184 Cf supra note 29.
185 Cf. Drug Money Is Laundered Through Tokyo, Wall St. J., Sept. 7-8, 1990, col. 3 at 14 (effec-
tive Oct. 1, 1990, Japanese financial institutions required to disclose cash transactions of more than
30 million Yen ($210,000)).
186 Cf EG-Richtlinie gegen Geldwdscherei?, NZZ, Feb. 15, 1990, No. 37 at 13 (European Com-
munity directive being drafted to require all entities engaging in finance and credit transactions to
report each transaction which, in their opinion, is connected with drug trade, terrorism or other non-
tax related crime).
187 Cf US-Grosseinsatz gegen die Geldwcsherei, supra note 18 (over 11 million financial transac-
tions reported to responsible U.S. agency within past two years); accord C. GRABER, supra note 8, at
63 n. 68 (Switzerland described as 10 to 15 years behind neighboring countries in combat against
illegal drug trade; currently, 22 employees within Federal Central Department for Combating Drug
Trade).
188 C. GRABER, supra note 8, at 62.
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country, but also under the laws of Switzerland. 18 9 Because money laun-
dering was until recently punishable only in certain rare instances, the
newly-enacted legislation criminalizing money laundering may thus be
expected to improve the ability of foreign legal officers to track down and
prosecute internationally active professional money launderers with the
help of requests for judicial assistance. Further, perhaps more impor-
tantly, the new legislation will provide Swiss legal officers an opportunity
to open an investigation or criminal proceeding on their "own initiative",
i.e., through an informal orientation by foreign legal officers rather than
on the basis of a formal request for judicial assistance. 190
VI. CONCLUSION.
It is open to question whether the steps taken to date within Switzer-
land will, in and of themselves, prove effective in perceptibly reducing
Switzerland's function as a global magnet for dirty money. Swiss legisla-
tors have announced their intent, however, to enact certain supplemental
criminal and administrative measures to increase the arsenal of weapons
available to combat organized crime in Switzerland.191 Additional meas-
ures contemplated by the Swiss Federal Council and currently being
drafted by an expert commission appointed by the Federal Justice and
Police Department include new Penal Code provisions to punish mem-
bership in a crime organization,' 92 to extend the new money laundering
legislation to legal entities as well as natural persons and to provide for
prompter confiscation procedures vis-a-vis assets suspected to have
stemmed from a crime' 93 . It is hoped, further, that Swiss legislators will
authorize funds for the creation of a specialized police unit or agency to
patrol compliance with the new money laundering legislation.
In the final analysis, the new initiative in Switzerland to combat
money laundering and organized crime - including the Federal Tribu-
189 Id. at 62, 63.
190 Id at 63. The latter approach offers certain advantages, because Swiss law and treaties allow
affected parties and even so-called "unaffected" third parties to delay the granting of judicial assist-
ance through lengthy appeal proceedings. IdL at 70.
191 Nationalrat ratifiziert Geldwdscherartikel, supra note 151.
192 The concept of "organized crime" does not exist under current Swiss criminal or civil law,
although the term is used and defined by the Treaty of May 25, 1973 between Switzerland and the
United States concerning Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. C. GRADER, supra note 8, at 148-
49.
193 Nationalrat ratifiziert Geldwdscherartikel, supra note 147. Among the most oft-repeated pro-
posals in this regard is that the burden of proving the non-criminal origin of the funds awaiting
confiscation be shifted, under certain circumstances, to the defendant. C. GRABER, supra note 8, at
96. An expert commission is expected to submit proposed revisions to the Penal Code's confiscation
provisions in late 1990. Id at 97.
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nal's expanded interpretation of the Narcotics Act - may be expected, as
an initial matter, to deter representatives of organized crime from routing
dirty money through Swiss financial channels. Further, the "pioneer"
measures enacted in Switzerland will inevitably be held up, in the future,
as a role model for other popular havens of financial tourism. In this
respect alone, the new Swiss money laundering legislation represents an
important step forward in efforts to build a global, coordinated front
against organized crime.
